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MARYLAND v. KING: SACRIFICING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO BUILD UP THE DNA DATABASE 
STEPHANIE B. NORONHA
*
 
In Maryland v. King,
1
 a sharply divided United States Supreme Court 
held that a Maryland law allowing warrantless collection of genetic 
information from people who have been arrested for, but not convicted of, 
serious crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches.
2
  While the use of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) 
evidence to convict or exonerate criminal defendants has increased steadily 
over the past few decades,
3
 the Court’s decision in King has grave 
implications for the collection of DNA from arrestees—people who are 
supposed to be presumed innocent.
4
 
Although DNA technology is undoubtedly a powerful crime fighting 
tool,
5
 the King Court’s assessment of the DNA collection of arrestees under 
the reasonableness balancing test
6
 is a misguided judicial response to the 
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 1. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 1980. 
 3.  WILSON J. WALL, GENETICS AND DNA TECHNOLOGY: LEGAL ASPECTS 20–21 (2002).  
The use of DNA for criminal purposes was a direct offshoot of its use in medical research.  Id. at 
15.  In 1984, while studying how inherited illnesses pass through families, English geneticist Alec 
Jeffreys discovered, by chance, that particular regions of DNA contained repeating DNA 
sequences.  He quickly realized that these repeating sequences were highly variable and could be 
used to distinguish individuals.  Alec Jeffreys and Genetic Fingerprinting, UNIVERSITY OF 
LEICESTER, http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/genetics/jeffreys (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). 
 4.  See infra Part II.B. 
 5.  Sarah Hammond, The DNA Factor: June 2010, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATORS (June 2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/the-dna-factor.aspx (explaining the growing role of DNA evidence in criminal 
investigations). 
 6.  See infra Part I.A.  
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immediate benefits of new technology, and it leaves room for government 
abuse.
7
  Unlike searches of physical places and things, a search of 
someone’s DNA is unique with respect to the physical intrusion necessary 
to effectuate the search
8
 and the amount of data rendered by the search.
9
  
While DNA searches require limited physical invasion of the human body, 
they yield a considerable amount of aggregated data.
10
  Thus, these types of 
searches are complex and require special consideration.  The King Court, 
however, wrongly applied the reasonableness balancing test.
11
  Instead, the 
Court should have relied on a line of cases that involves searching data on 
seized computers, which are more comparable to cases on collecting and 
searching DNA data.  If the Court had done so, the Court would have found 
that similar to the requirement to obtain a search warrant to search data on 
seized computers, the government should be required to obtain a search 
warrant before entering an arrestee’s DNA profile into a DNA database to 
search for a “hit.”12 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”13  Constantly advancing 
technology has muddled the judiciary’s application of those words to real-
life situations.  DNA technology is one such example, and federal and state 
courts have assessed the constitutionality of DNA collection under varying 
tests
14
 and have disagreed as to whom DNA statutes apply.
15
 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part II.A. 
 8.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 9.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 10.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 11.  See infra Part II.A. 
 12.  See infra Part II.C. 
 13.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The full text reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  Id.  
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to Maryland and every other state through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained as 
a result of an unlawful search was “inadmissible in a state court”); see also infra Part I.A. 
 14.  See infra Part I.B.1. 
 15.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
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A.  Fourth Amendment Overview: Assessing “Reasonableness” Within 
the Context of the Fourth Amendment 
The U.S. Constitution prohibits only “unreasonable” searches.16  Thus, 
once a court has determined that a government action is indeed a “search,” 
triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of 
the search must subsequently be determined.  As Supreme Court Justice 
Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence in Katz v. United States17 described, a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the 
government violates an individual’s “actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and that expectation is one that society would acknowledge as 
reasonable.
18
  A search warrant based on probable cause generally satisfies 
the inquiry of whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment,
19
 although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
“neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of 
individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness 
in every circumstance.”20  For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n,21 the Court concluded that where a Fourth Amendment 
intrusion serves “‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement,’” a court may “balance the governmental and privacy interests 
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in 
the particular context.”22  In the event that adherence to the warrant and 
probable cause requirements is impracticable, the search may be 
constitutional under certain circumstances.
23
  In these situations, the 
                                                          
 16.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”  Id.  (emphasis added).  See 
also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.’” (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991))). 
 17.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 18.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted this test in 
Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 51–52, 59, 367 A.2d 949, 952, 956 (1977).  
 19.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (explaining that “[i]n 
most criminal cases” where there was a valid warrant issued upon probable cause, the Court has 
found reasonableness).  The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to demonstrate 
to a neutral magistrate that they have probable cause to believe the search will reveal particular 
evidence of a crime.  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–15 (1948).  In Illinois v. Gates, 
the Supreme Court set out the modern “totality-of-the-circumstances” test for determining 
probable cause.  462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  Among other factors, this analysis takes into 
consideration the basis of knowledge of the person supplying the information and whether the 
information is trustworthy.  Id. at 230. 
 20.  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). 
 21.  489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 22.  Id. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
 23.  Id.  
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Supreme Court has applied the “special needs” test in cases involving 
school searches,
24
 searches of public employees,
25
 searches of probationers’ 
homes,
26
 and drug testing of individuals under certain circumstances.
27
 
The Supreme Court has also applied a “reasonableness balancing test” 
to warrantless searches, assessing reasonableness by weighing the invasion 
of an individual’s privacy against the government’s interest.28  For example, 
in United States v. Knights,
29
 the Court held that a warrantless search of a 
probationer’s apartment, “supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized 
by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”30  Applying the reasonableness balancing test, the 
Court concluded that Knights’ status as a probationer diminished his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
31
  This diminished expectation was 
outweighed by the government’s interest in apprehending criminals.32 
Five years later, the Supreme Court extended the Knights holding in 
Samson v. California.
33
  The Court applied the same balancing test to 
determine whether a suspicionless search of a parolee on a public street was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
34
  The Court considered the 
conditions for a parolee’s release, “including mandatory drug tests, 
restrictions on [personal] association[s] . . . and mandatory meetings with 
                                                          
 24.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985) (concluding that school officials 
need not obtain a warrant nor have probable cause that a student under their authority has violated 
the law prior to searching the student; rather, the legality of a search under such circumstances 
should depend on “the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search”). 
 25.  See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (holding that “public employer 
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for 
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, 
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances”). 
 26.  See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872–73, 875 (1987) (upholding a warrantless 
search of a probationer’s home because of the government’s “special need” for “the exercise of 
supervision to assure that the [probation] restrictions are in fact observed”).  
 27.  See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (upholding warrantless and suspicionless alcohol and drug 
tests for railway employees); cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) 
(striking down an automobile checkpoint program “whose primary purpose was to detect evidence 
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” and explaining that this type of “‘general interest in crime 
control’” may not qualify as a special need (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 
(1979))). 
 28.  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117–19 (2001). 
 29.  534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 30.  Id. at 122. 
 31.  Id. at 119–20. 
 32.  Id. at 119–22.  The high recidivism rate of probationers also weighed against Knights’ 
privacy interest.  Id. at 120. 
 33.  547 U.S. 843, 847, 857 (2006). 
 34.  Id. at 846–47, 850–53. 
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parole officers.”35  According to the Court, “parolees have fewer 
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to 
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.”36  The Court ultimately 
held that the government’s interest in protecting society from future crime 
outweighed the parolee’s already diminished expectation of privacy.37 
B.  Applying the Fourth Amendment to DNA Collection: An Overview 
of Courts’ Analyses of DNA Collection Laws 
In acknowledging the Fourth Amendment as a protector of “people, 
not places,”38 the Supreme Court in Katz held that the warrantless 
wiretapping of a public phone booth constituted an unreasonable search.
39
  
That decision came at an important time in American history, when 
technological advances facilitated intrusion, without physical trespass, into 
many aspects of people’s lives.40  Technological advances in the forty-six 
years since Katz have made it easier to invade someone’s privacy.  As a 
result, the Supreme Court now faces the difficult task of interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment so that it can keep pace with rapid technological 
innovations. 
Recently in United States v. Jones,
41
 the Court confronted the question 
of whether the government’s warrantless installation of an electronic 
tracking device—a global positioning system (“GPS”)—on the car of a 
suspect’s wife violated the Fourth Amendment.42  The government 
monitored the GPS for twenty-eight days and collected more than two 
thousand pages of data before arresting the suspect, Antoine Jones, for 
trafficking narcotics.
43
  The Court held that the government’s actions 
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that 
a warrantless search such as this one violated the Fourth Amendment.
44
 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 851. 
 36.  Id. at 850. 
 37.  Id. at 852–54, 856–57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 39.  Id. at 357–59. 
 40.  See, e.g., Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Model for Illinois?, 
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 274 n.510 (1989) (“In the 1960’s [sic], public consciousness of new 
threats to privacy grew as technological break-throughs made possible new kinds of previously 
unknown surveillance.”). 
 41.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 42.  Id. at 948–49. 
 43.  Id. at 948. 
 44.  Id. at 949.  Although the Court found the government’s actions constituted a Fourth 
Amendment “search,” the Court ultimately determined the case on common law trespass theory.  
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In addition to powerful electronic tracking devices capable of 
revealing a person’s location, the advent of technology made possible the 
extraordinary ability to analyze a person’s genetic material.  Numerous 
federal court decisions leave little doubt that the collection of DNA and the 
subsequent matching of the sample in a DNA database constitute a “search” 
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
45
  Federal and state courts, however, 
disagree on several questions raised by the practice of collecting 
individuals’ DNA, as well as its implications on Fourth Amendment rights.  
First, although federal circuits almost unanimously upheld the 
constitutionality of suspicionless DNA searches of convicted criminals,
46
 
they assessed the constitutionality of DNA collection under different tests: a 
majority of circuits applied the reasonableness balancing test, while a 
minority of circuits applied the special needs test.
47
  Second, federal and 
state courts disagreed as to whom the DNA statutes apply.
48
  Both federal 
and state DNA collection laws now allow DNA collection from more than 
just convicted criminals.
49
  Prior to the Court’s decision in King, federal and 
                                                          
Id. at 950–51.  Thus, the Court declined to address the government’s argument that attachment 
and use of the GPS device was nonetheless reasonable, even if it were a search.  Id. at 954. 
 45.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (recognizing 
that the collection and chemical testing of urine, blood, and breath samples constitute searches 
under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The 
government does not dispute the drawing of blood for purposes of DNA collection is a search 
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that “the extraction and analysis of [prisoners’] blood for DNA-indexing purposes 
constituted a search implicating the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 
175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Requiring [an individual] to give a blood sample constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search.”); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The 
Commissioner does not dispute that the statutorily required extraction of saliva for DNA profiling 
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the [Fourth] Amendment.”); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“The compulsory extraction of blood for DNA 
profiling unquestionably implicates the right to personal security embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment, and thus constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Constitution.”); Green v. 
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the taking of a DNA sample is clearly a 
search”); Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The 
extraction of blood from a prisoner to collect a DNA sample implicates Fourth Amendment 
rights.”); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]btaining and analyzing the 
DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth 
Amendment concerns . . . .”); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (“It appears to 
be established, at least with respect to free persons, that the bodily intrusion resulting from taking 
a blood sample constitutes a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 46.  See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 830–32 n.25 (citing over thirty decisions in which both federal 
and state courts have upheld DNA collection statutes, and noting that it could find only two 
instances in which courts held such a law unconstitutional). 
 47.  See infra Part I.B.1. 
 48.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 49.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
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state courts were sharply divided on whether DNA collection from arrestees 
is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
50
 
1.  Federal Circuits Apply Different Fourth Amendment Tests to 
DNA Collection 
A majority of federal circuits adopted the Supreme Court’s 
reasonableness balancing test for use in DNA collection cases.
51
  For 
example, in United States v. Kincade,
52
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit used the balancing analysis to uphold compulsory DNA 
profiling of convicted offenders.
53
  Similarly, in Jones v. Murray,
54
 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Virginia legislation 
directing the state to take and store the blood of convicted felons for DNA 
analysis was constitutional.
55
  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, 
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits followed suit, applying the reasonableness 
balancing test to determine the constitutionality of DNA sampling of 
convicted persons.
56
 
The minority of courts, namely the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Seventh Circuits, applied the special needs test to uphold the 
constitutionality of DNA indexing laws.
57
  For example, in United States v. 
Amerson,
58
 the Second Circuit upheld a federal law
59
 requiring DNA 
sample collection from any individual convicted of a felony, including 
                                                          
 50.  See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 51.  See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying the balancing 
test); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. 
Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (same).  
 52.  379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 53.  Id. at 836–39. 
 54.  962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 55.  Id. at 303, 305, 308. 
 56.  See, e.g., Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding a 
Georgia statute, which required DNA sampling of all convicted felons, by applying the balancing 
test); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184–87 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the balancing 
test to determine that collecting DNA from individuals on supervised release is constitutional); 
Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 412–14 (5th Cir. 2004) (using the 
balancing test to uphold the collection of DNA from prisoners convicted of armed bank robbery 
and conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery). 
 57.  See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655–56, 667 (2d Cir. 2005) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of New York’s DNA-database statute, which permitted extraction and analysis of 
convicted felons’ blood for DNA-indexing purposes, under the “special needs” test); Green v. 
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a Wisconsin statute, which 
required persons convicted of felonies to provide DNA samples for storage in a data bank, 
satisfied the “special needs” test). 
 58.  483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 59.  Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–405, 118 Stat. 2260. 
 674 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:667 
 
nonviolent felons who are sentenced only to probation.
60
  According to the 
court, collecting DNA samples to create a DNA index qualifies as a special 
need because creating a DNA index “fulfills important purposes that could 
not be achieved by reliance on ‘normal’ law enforcement methodology.”61 
2.  Federal and State Courts Disagree as to Whom DNA Statutes 
Apply 
Over time, the disagreements surrounding DNA issues increased as 
state and federal laws expanded the application of DNA collection laws 
from certain dangerous and violent felons, to all convicted people, and 
eventually, in some jurisdictions, to arrestees.
62
  As these laws changed, 
courts at both the federal and state levels issued divergent opinions 
regarding the constitutionality of requiring arrestees to submit to DNA 
collection.
63
 
a.  Changing Law: Federal and State Laws Move Toward DNA 
Collection from Arrestees 
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act (the “Act”),64 allowing the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) to establish and maintain an index of DNA samples 
from convicted criminals, crime scenes, and unidentified human remains.
65
  
In response to the Act, the FBI established the Combined DNA Index 
System (“CODIS”).66  CODIS allows federal, state, and local forensic 
laboratories to share DNA profiles in an attempt to tie evidence from crime 
                                                          
 60.  Amerson, 483 F.3d at 75. 
 61.  Id. at 82–83. 
 62.  See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
 63.  See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 64.  Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 210304, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).  
 65.  See id. (The Director of the FBI has the authority to create “an index of DNA 
identification records of (A) persons convicted of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in 
an indictment or information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples are 
collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that . . . DNA samples that are voluntarily 
submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index 
System.”  The Director may also index the analyses of DNA samples obtained from “crime 
scenes,” “unidentified human remains,” and “relatives of missing persons” that are voluntarily 
provided). 
 66.  CODIS Brochure, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-brochure-2010 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
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scenes, in which there were no suspects, to DNA samples of convicted 
offenders on file in the system.
67
 
Then, in 2000, Congress passed a new program to help clear state 
backlogs of DNA samples—the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 
2000 (the “2000 DNA Act”).68  This federal statute approved the collection, 
analysis, and indexing of DNA samples from people convicted of federal 
crimes, and required convicted felons to submit DNA samples to the 
national database.
69
  The 2000 DNA Act also expanded eligibility for 
inclusion in CODIS by requiring federal parolees and probationers to 
provide DNA samples.
70
  Early federal cases such as Jones v. Murray
71
 and 
Roe v. Marcotte
72
 upheld similar DNA statutes.  Today, all fifty states have 
passed statutes that require some or all convicted felons to provide a DNA 
sample for inclusion in CODIS or state database systems.
73
 
In 2004, Congress passed the Justice for All Act (the “2004 DNA 
Act”), which expanded CODIS to include individuals charged with a crime 
and, in some circumstances, arrestees.
74
  The following year, Congress 
                                                          
 67.  Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
 68.  DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat. 
2726 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a). 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id.   
 71.  962 F.2d 302, 303, 307–08 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding a Virginia law allowing the 
collection and storing of blood of convicted felons for DNA analysis).   
 72.  193 F.3d 72, 74, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of a Connecticut 
statute requiring convicted sex offenders to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis and inclusion 
in the DNA databank).  
 73.  DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm.  See also State v. 
Raines, 383 Md. 1, 8, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (2004) (“In the last fifteen years, state governments began 
to enact DNA collection statutes, and currently all fifty states and the federal government . . . have 
some type of DNA collection statute that requires some or all convicted felons to submit a tissue 
sample, either blood, saliva or other tissue, for DNA profile analysis and storage in a DNA data 
bank.”).  In 2004, the Court decided Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, where it 
found that a law requiring a person subjected to a Terry stop to identify himself did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment; in other words, this person did not have a right to withhold his identity from 
police.  542 U.S. 177, 181–82, 187–88 (2004). 
 74.  Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260 (amending § 
210304 of the DNA Identification Act of 1994 (codified as 42 U.S.C. 14132)).  In amending the 
prior words “of persons convicted of crimes,” Section 203 (a)(1) inserted the following:  
of—(A) persons convicted of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in an 
indictment or information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples are 
collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA profiles from arrestees 
who have not been charged in an indictment or information with a crime, and DNA 
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passed the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005,
75
 which made two key changes.  
First, the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 amended Section 3 of the 2000 
DNA Act, which only approved collection of DNA from those already 
convicted.
76
  Second, Section 1004 of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 
permitted the collection of DNA samples from “individuals who are 
arrested or from non-United States persons who are detained under the 
authority of the United States.”77 
b. Variations in Specific State Laws on DNA Collection of 
Arrestees 
As of June 2012, twenty-eight of the fifty states, in addition to the 
federal government, have passed DNA collection laws that permit the 
collection of DNA from arrestees.
78
  These laws differ from each other in 
many aspects, including the types of offenses that make arrestees eligible 
for DNA collection, the moment at which a sample can be collected or 
analyzed, and expungement processes if a charge is dismissed or 
exonerated.
79
  California and Maryland exemplify the variances between 
DNA arrestee statutes. 
i.  California 
California’s DNA collection law for arrestees is very broad.  Since 
2009, California police departments have collected DNA from anyone 
arrested for a felony under provisions of Proposition 69, a statewide ballot 
measure approved in 2004 that initially applied only to people convicted of 
felonies and arrested for certain violent crimes.
80
  California’s more recent 
law allows for DNA collection upon arrest for any felony, including 
                                                          
samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be 
included in the National DNA Index System. 
 75.  DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 1001–1005, 119 Stat. 3084, 
3084–86 (2006) (codified in various parts of Sections 18 and 42 of the United States Code).  This 
Act is also known as Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005.   
 76.  DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat. 
2726 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a). 
 77.  DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, supra note 75, § 1004.  
 78.  DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, supra note 73. 
 79.  See infra Parts I.B.2.b.i.–ii. 
 80.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(A)–(B) (West 2013) (mandating law enforcement to 
collect DNA samples from “[a]ny adult person who is arrested for or charged with any of the 
following felony offenses: (A) Any felony offense . . . or attempt to commit any felony offense . . . 
or any felony offense that imposes upon a person the duty to register in California as a sex 
offender . . . .  (B) Murder or voluntary manslaughter or any attempt to commit murder or 
voluntary manslaughter”). 
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financial and drug crimes.
81
  This law also allows law enforcement to 
collect and analyze the DNA information, as well as to enter the genetic 
evidence into a state data bank.
82
  If the charge against an arrestee is 
ultimately dismissed or the arrestee is exonerated, that person must 
affirmatively take action to have his or her genetic profile removed from the 
database; expungement is not automatic.
83
 
ii.  Maryland 
Unlike California, Maryland’s DNA collection law for arrestees (the 
“Maryland DNA Collection Act”) allows DNA collection only from 
individuals arrested for serious felonies.
84
  In light of Fourth Amendment 
privacy concerns, the Maryland DNA Collection Act (along with three 
other state DNA collection laws for arrestees) requires probable cause 
before a DNA sample can be analyzed.
85
  Moreover, Maryland is more 
restrictive than states like California in that the Maryland DNA Collection 
Act requires the automatic removal of an arrestee’s genetic profile if the 
charge against the arrestee is dismissed or exonerated.
86
  Also, the Maryland 
DNA Collection Act does not permit familial searches, wherein law 
                                                          
 81.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (West 2013).  Under California law a felony is: “[A] crime 
which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison.  Every other crime or 
public offense is a misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as infraction.”  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 17.  This DNA law was later found unconstitutional in People v. Buza, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  The case was eventually transferred to the California 
Supreme Court with directions to vacate and reconsider in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Maryland v. King.  People v. Buza, 302 P.3d 1051 (Cal. 2013). 
 82.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (West 2013). 
 83.  See id. § 299 (noting that a person with “no past or present qualifying offense . . . may 
make a written request to have his or her specimen and sample destroyed and searchable database 
profile expunged from the data bank” if certain criteria are met). 
 84.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY  § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (West 2013).  The statute states that a 
DNA sample shall be collected from individuals charged with “a crime of violence or an attempt 
to commit a crime of violence” or “burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.”  Id. 
 85.  Id.; see also Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation 
Lessons, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (June 2012), available at 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/270/pages/arrestee-dna.aspx (last modified Sept. 18, 2012) 
(“[A]rraignment or a judicial probable cause determination is needed for collection in Florida, 
Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia; Texas requires an 
indictment or waiver of indictment if the arrestee has not been previously convicted of or placed 
on deferred adjudication for a qualifying offense. Probable cause is needed for analysis in 
Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico (2011) and Utah.”). 
 86.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a)(1) (West 2013). 
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enforcement uses DNA databases to search for genetic information 
indicating a relative of a person they seek to identify.
87
 
c. The Split: Federal and State Courts Diverge as They 
Consider DNA Collection from Individuals Who Have Been 
Arrested but Not Yet Convicted 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in King, federal and state courts 
were split as to the constitutionality of requiring arrestees to submit to DNA 
sample collection.
88
  At the federal level, the Ninth Circuit, in United States 
v. Pool,
89
 upheld the constitutionality of an order requiring the defendant—
who had been arrested, indicted, and detained for a federal felony but not 
yet convicted—to provide a DNA sample as a condition of his pretrial 
release.
90
  Similarly, a divided Third Circuit held in United States v. 
Mitchell
91
 that taking a DNA sample from a pretrial arrestee did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.
92
  The Third Circuit adopted a fingerprint/DNA 
analogy, concluding that a DNA profile serves only to identify arrestees and 
thus, like fingerprinting, it is an acceptable “routine booking procedure[].”93 
A similar divide occurred at the state level.  In Anderson v. 
Commonwealth,
94
 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the 
constitutionality of a Virginia law that permitted law enforcement to collect 
DNA samples of rape arrestees.
95
  In contrast, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals in In re Welfare of C.T.L.
96
 held that Minnesota’s DNA statute 
                                                          
 87.  Id. § 2-506(d) (“A person may not perform a search of the statewide DNA data base for 
the purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may 
be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”). 
 88.  Compare Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851, 858 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that 
the search and seizure of a pretrial detainee’s DNA was unconstitutional), and In re Welfare of 
C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that a state statute authorizing 
DNA sampling from an individual who has been charged but not yet convicted violates the Fourth 
Amendment), with United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding 
that a federal statute, which allowed DNA collection from arrestees and pretrial detainees, is 
constitutional), and United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172CJS, 2011 WL 1627321, at *1 
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2011) (adopting the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the federal DNA 
statute was constitutional as applied to an indicted but not convicted person). 
 89.  621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as 
moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 90.  Id. at 1214–15, 1228. 
 91.  652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 92.  Id. at 389–90. 
 93.  Id. at 413. 
 94.  650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007). 
 95.  Id. at 704, 706.   
 96.  722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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authorizing DNA sampling from indicted, but not yet convicted individuals, 
violated the Fourth Amendment.
97
  Similarly, a California appellate court 
found the California DNA collection law for arrestees unconstitutional.
98
 
3.  Maryland v. King: DNA Collection upon Arrest Is Reasonable 
Under the Fourth Amendment 
On April 10, 2009, Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested in Wicomico 
County, Maryland, on first- and second-degree assault charges.
99
  During 
booking, King’s DNA was collected via buccal swab under the authority of 
the Maryland DNA Collection Act.
100
  On July 13, 2009, King’s DNA 
sample was entered into the state’s database.101  While he was awaiting trial 
on his assault charges, King’s DNA profile generated a match to a DNA 
sample that was collected in a 2003 unsolved rape case in Salisbury, 
Maryland.
102
 
The DNA match was presented to a grand jury, which indicted King 
for the 2003 rape.
103
  The grand jury did not consider any other evidence 
before returning the indictment, making the DNA match the sole link of 
King to that crime.
104
  Arguing that the Maryland DNA statute was 
unconstitutional, King moved to suppress the DNA match.
105
  The 
Maryland Circuit Court for Wicomico County upheld the statute as 
constitutional and, after pleading not guilty, King was convicted for the 
rape charge and sentenced to life in prison without parole.
106
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Circuit 
Court decision, finding the provisions of the Maryland DNA Collection Act 
that allowed collection of DNA from felony arrestees to be in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.
107
  The majority concluded that a DNA swab was 
an unreasonable search because King’s “‘expectation of privacy is greater 
than the State’s purported interest in using King’s DNA to identify him.’”108 
                                                          
 97.  Id. at 486, 491–92. 
 98.  People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); see also supra note 81. 
 99.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 1965–66. 
 103.  Id. at 1966. 
 104.  Id. at 1965. 
 105.  Id. at 1966. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. (quoting King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 561, 42 A.3d 549, 556 (2012)). 
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In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, concluding that “DNA identification of 
arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine 
booking procedure.”109  Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
acknowledged the reasonableness balancing test, which weighs the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy against the state’s interest in conducting 
the search, as the appropriate measure of Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” under the circumstances.110 
Justice Kennedy considered five “legitimate government interest[s] 
served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act.”111  These included the need 
of law enforcement to: (1) know the identity of the person arrested, 
including his or her criminal history;
112
 (2) know the level of risk the 
individual poses to the public;
113
 (3) “ensur[e] that persons accused of 
crimes are available for trials”;114 (4) “prevent[] crime by arrestees”;115 and 
(5) “free[] a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same offense.”116  
Turning to the individual’s privacy interests, Justice Kennedy opined that a 
buccal swab of the inner cheek involves “minimal intrusion.”117  
Additionally, “the processing of [King’s] DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci did 
not intrude on [his] privacy in a way that would make his DNA 
identification unconstitutional” because “the CODIS loci come from 
noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal [] genetic traits” or “private 
medical information,” and, even if they did, “they are not in fact tested for 
that end.”118 
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Fourth Amendment 
categorically prohibits “searching a person for evidence of a crime” without 
cause.
119
  He doubted the majority’s identification rationale, stating clearly 
“this search had nothing to do with establishing King’s identity.”120  Finally, 
he repudiated the majority’s analogy between DNA collection and 
fingerprinting, noting that “fingerprints of arrestees are taken primarily to 
                                                          
 109.  Id. at 1980. 
 110.  Id. at 1970. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 1971–72. 
 113.  Id. at 1972. 
 114.  Id. at 1972–73 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)). 
 115.  Id. at 1973 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987)). 
 116.  Id. at 1974. 
 117.  Id. at 1979. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 120.  Id. at 1984. 
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identify them” whereas “the DNA of arrestees is taken to solve crimes (and 
nothing else).”121 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Today, the federal government and more than half of the Nation’s 
states have laws similar to the Maryland DNA Collection Act that permit 
the collection of DNA from some or all arrestees.
122
  The Supreme Court’s 
recent ruling in Maryland v. King has important consequences for every 
state and for the constitutional privacy rights of all citizens.
123
  Although the 
facts of King left little doubt that the defendant had committed a heinous 
crime,
124
 the Court’s holding that the warrantless collection and processing 
of DNA from an arrestee is a constitutional search departs from the 
fundamental values originally embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
125
  As a 
result, Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights have been weakened—forced 
to take a backseat to the advantages of new technology.
126
  Unlike searches 
of physical places and things, a search of DNA is unique with respect to the 
place being searched,
127
 the physical intrusion needed to effect the search,
128
 
and the amount of data rendered.
129
  The technology of DNA collection 
permits intrusion inside the human body with very limited physical 
invasion, but yields aggregated data.
130
  Instead of applying the 
reasonableness balancing test in this context
131—and thereby leaving open 
many unresolved questions
132—the Court should have looked to a line of 
cases that involves problems analogous to DNA collection, such as cases 
                                                          
 121.  Id. at 1987. 
 122.  Id. at 1968 (majority opinion). 
 123.  See infra Parts II.A–C. 
 124.  Subsequent to his arrest, law enforcement uploaded a sample of King’s DNA to the 
Maryland DNA database, which, as a result, produced a match to a DNA sample collected in an 
unsolved rape case from 2003.  King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966.  The majority explained the advantages 
of DNA identification: “[T]he utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is 
already undisputed . . . .  Future refinements may improve present technology, but even now STR 
analysis makes it possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches a suspect with near 
certainty.”  Id. at 1966–67 (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
 125.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 126.  See infra Parts II.A.1–3. 
 127.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 128.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 129.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 130.  See infra Part II.A. 
 131.  See infra Part II.A. 
 132.  See infra Part II.B. 
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involving searches of data on seized computers.
133
  By comparing the legal 
issues implicated by computer searches to those implicated by DNA 
collection, the Court would have found that, similar to searches of seized 
computers, the government should be required to obtain a search warrant 
before entering an arrestee’s DNA profile into a DNA database to search for 
a “hit.”134 
A.  The King Court Wrongly Applied the Reasonableness Balancing 
Test and Thus Did Not Properly Assess the Constitutionality of 
DNA Collection and Analysis 
While Maryland v. King is the first case in which the Supreme Court 
encountered the difficult task of determining the constitutionality of DNA 
collection of arrestees,
135
 it is not the only time the Court has assessed the 
impact that advanced technology and intrusions into the body have on 
Fourth Amendment rights.
136
  The facts of King, however, forced the 
Supreme Court to consider both issues simultaneously in making its 
decision on whether the search of an arrestee by way of collecting and 
analyzing his DNA violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches.
137
  The Court applied the reasonableness balancing 
test to determine the reasonableness of such a search “‘by assessing, on the 
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, 
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests,’”138 taking into account the “‘totality of 
the circumstances.’”139  The Court found three factors relevant to its 
assessment: (1) the status of the person from whom evidence is gathered;
140
 
(2) the physical intrusion the search entails;
141
 and (3) the type of evidence 
gathered, including the amount of information that evidence is capable of 
                                                          
 133.  See infra Part II.C. 
 134.  See infra Part II.C. 
 135.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013) (“[T]he DNA swab procedure used here 
presents a question the Court has not yet addressed . . . .”). 
 136.  See supra Parts I.A–B. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). For a more detailed discussion on the reasonableness balancing test 
and other cases where the Court has applied this test, see supra Part I.A.  
 139.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). 
 140.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 141.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
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revealing.
142
  The Court’s assessment of these three factors undervalued an 
arrestee’s privacy interests and the protection of privacy interests in general. 
1.  Arrestee Status 
Since 2000, the Supreme Court has twice applied the reasonableness 
balancing test in Fourth Amendment cases involving individuals serving 
post-conviction punishments: addressing the issue of probationers in United 
States v. Knights
143
 and, more recently, the issue of parolees in Samson v. 
California.
144
  In these cases, the Court explained that a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy depends on the level of freedom that person enjoys 
in society.
145
  People under state control—including prisoners, probationers, 
and parolees—exist on a “‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments,” and 
thus are accorded more limited privacy than free citizens.
146
  The Samson 
Court explained that “[o]n this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations 
of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment 
than probation is to imprisonment.”147  What is alarming about the Court’s 
privacy analysis in King is its implication that arrestees, by virtue of their 
status alone, belong somewhere on this continuum.
148
  In placing arrestees 
on this continuum, the Court considered the diminished expectations of 
privacy associated with being arrested and effectively suggested that a 
                                                          
 142.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 143.  534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 144.  547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 145.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20 (“The probation condition thus significantly diminished 
Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy.”).  But see id. at 120 n.6 (“We do not decide whether 
the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ reasonable expectation 
of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion 
would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).  The Court in 
Samson, however, ruled on this specific issue and held that it does, stating: 
We granted certiorari . . . to answer a variation of the question this Court left open in 
United States v. Knights . . . whether a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate 
a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a 
law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.  Answering that 
question in the affirmative today, we affirm the judgment of the California Court of 
Appeal. 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.  
 146.  Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 119).  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (“The expectations of privacy of an 
individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’” (quoting Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979))). 
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search via collection and analysis of DNA is less invasive on an arrestee’s 
privacy as opposed to the privacy of a free citizen.
149
 
There are two groups of people that are directly affected by laws that 
authorize the collection of DNA upon arrest: those who are found guilty of 
the crime and those who are found not guilty.  Because DNA collection and 
analysis is already permitted for those convicted of certain crimes,
150
 DNA 
laws concerning arrestees do not expand current law enforcement 
investigative capabilities for the former group.  Thus, the real target of 
DNA laws concerning arrestees is the latter group—those who are 
ultimately found not guilty.  This fact is what distinguishes arrestees from 
probationers and parolees and what weakens the validity of the King 
Court’s reliance on the continuum and the diminished expectation of 
privacy theories set out in cases such as Knights and Samson. 
There is a second plausible way the situation in King might be 
distinguished from the Court’s rulings in Samson and Knights.  In Samson, 
an officer who was aware of Samson’s parolee status searched him without 
any specific suspicion that Samson had committed a crime.
151
  Affirming 
the reasoning in Knights and ultimately finding the search reasonable, the 
Court found “salient” the requirement that probationers and parolees be 
clearly and unambiguously informed of their search conditions and 
concluded that awareness of such conditions removed a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.
152
  In these cases, both Samson and Knights 
consented to suspicionless searches and were unambiguously aware of what 
consent meant, facts that the Court found important and weighed heavily in 
its application of the reasonableness balancing test.
153
 
In King, however, the Court made no mention of consent.  If consent 
were so critical in weighing the privacy expectation interest in Samson and 
Knights, surely the fact that arrestees have no say in whether they want their 
DNA collected can, at the very minimum, weigh in favor of the individual 
privacy interests side of the balancing test.  The King Court, however, failed 
to address this issue—an example of how the reasonableness balancing test 
allows the Court to pick and choose what it deems pertinent to the privacy 
interests analysis. 
                                                          
 149.  Id.  
 150.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 151.  See Samson, 547 U.S. at 846–47 (“[P]ursuant to Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a) . . . and 
based solely on petitioner’s status as a parolee, Officer Rohleder searched petitioner.”). 
 152.  Id. at 852 (“In Knights, we found that acceptance of a clear and unambiguous search 
condition ‘significantly diminished Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (quoting United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001))).  
 153.  Id. at 850–52. 
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2.  The Physical Intrusion 
In addition to status, the King Court also found the degree of physical 
intrusion involved in the collection of DNA relevant to its overall 
assessment of the scope of individual privacy interests.
154
  One significant 
characteristic of DNA technology is its ability to invade privacy in a less 
physically intrusive way.
155
  Indeed, King is not the first time the Court has 
been confronted with technological innovations implicating constitutional 
privacy rights in this manner.
156
  For example, in Kyllo v. United States,
157
 
despite the lack of a physical invasion, the Court required a warrant to use 
thermal imaging to measure heat escaping from a house.
158
  Because the 
government had not obtained a warrant, the Court found the search 
unconstitutional.
159
 
Similar to the minimal invasion required to perform thermal imaging 
of a house, a DNA buccal swab of the inner cheek also involves minimal 
physical intrusion.  In fact, a buccal swab is substantially less intrusive than 
other types of approved intrusions to which arrestees are routinely 
subjected.
160
  Yet, the Court in Kyllo found the use of a thermal imaging 
device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation of heat from a 
home constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
                                                          
 154.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013). 
 155.  The collection of DNA via buccal swab “requires the collector to swab up-and-down and 
rotate a sterile cotton swab on the interior of the cheek in the subject’s mouth, with enough 
pressure to remove cells.”  King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 557 n.5, 42 A.2d 549, 553 n.5 (2012), 
rev’d. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).  The process of drawing blood requires the skin 
to be pierced and a foreign object to be inserted into the body for “a perceptible amount of time.”  
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1059, reh’g granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 156.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (deciding whether attachment 
of Global-Positioning-System “GPS” tracking device on a vehicle, and subsequent use of GPS 
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, is a lawful search); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (deciding whether warrantless use of thermal imaging device to 
measure heat emanating from home without physically invading the house is a lawful search); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (involving technology enabling human flight, that 
is, the airplane, which allowed public view of uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage 
that once were private); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explaining that even 
though a listening device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth and used to 
eavesdrop on defendant inside the telephone booth “did not happen to penetrate the wall of the 
booth,” this alone, “can have no constitutional significance”). 
 157.  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 158.  Id. at 40–41. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (describing the low level of 
physical intrusion that results from a blood test). 
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thereby requiring a search warrant.
161
 The Court in King, however, found 
that a DNA swab does not require a search warrant.
162
 
This reasoning begs the question: why is it that the Court finds 
privacy, secrecy, and autonomy within the four walls of the home 
paramount, but does not hold intrusion into the human body to as high of a 
standard?
163
  Why is it that when a person is lawfully arrested within the 
home, the government does not have the unrestricted authority to search the 
entire home, without probable cause, for evidence of other unrelated 
crimes,
164
 but the government may do so with the body?  The Court offers 
no satisfying answer.  Instead of requiring a warrant as it did in Kyllo, the 
Court in King applied the reasonableness balancing test, using the reduced 
physical intrusion on privacy as part of the justification for a government 
search that otherwise would not be permitted.  As a result, the two 
competing interests in the reasonableness balancing test—individual 
privacy and the government’s need for the intrusion—transform into 
dependent variables.
165
  As professor and author Scott E. Sundby explained, 
“the government’s ability to intrude in a less physically intrusive manner 
does not promote privacy interests but actually undermines the overall right 
to be free from government surveillance by expanding the scope of 
acceptable intrusions.”166 
Thus, while the Court continues to insist on strong justifications and 
prior judicial approval for police intrusion inside the home,
167
 it did not 
guard the expectations of privacy into the body as zealously as it should 
                                                          
 161.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 162.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 163.  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“But when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, the home is first among equals.  At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of 
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” 
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67, 101–02 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt whether [a probationer’s] reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his home [is] any less than petitioners’ reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their urine taken, or in the urine tests performed . . . .”).  
 164.  See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335–37 (1990) (limiting warrantless searches of the 
home in in-home arrests to a “protective sweep,” which must “be justified by probable cause to 
believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed”). 
 165.  Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between 
Government and Citizen?, in THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 297, 301 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011) 
(“[M]inimizing the level of the privacy intrusion can help compensate for a weaker government 
justification, such as one lacking individualized suspicion.”). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See United States v. Kyllo, 553 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“We have said that the Fourth 
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house . . . .’” (quoting Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))).  
 2014] MARYLAND v. KING 687 
 
have.  Instead, the Court allowed the breadth of Fourth Amendment 
protection to recede in the presence of innovative technology that, while 
minimally physically invasive, is just as much a violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
3.  The Type of Evidence 
Some federal and state courts view DNA collection and analysis from 
arrestees as a process that involves two separate “searches” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
168
  The first search is the physical 
intrusion caused by running the swab against the inner cheek (“first 
search”).169  The second search is the processing and analysis of the DNA 
sample (“second search”).170  The King Court provided insufficient 
consideration of this latter search.  While the first search may be minimally 
physically intrusive, it is the second search that conflicts with Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests.
171
  In its brief discussion of the privacy 
interests involved in the second search, the Court in King cites safeguards 
built within the Maryland DNA Collection Act: 
 [T]he processing of [King’s] DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci did 
not intrude on [his] privacy in a way that would make his DNA 
identification unconstitutional.  First . . . the CODIS loci come 
from noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic 
traits of the arrestee. . . .  And even if non-coding alleles could 
provide some information, they are not in fact tested for that end.  
It is undisputed that law enforcement officers analyze DNA for 
the sole purpose of generating a unique identifying number 
against which future samples may be matched. . . .  Finally, the 
Act provides statutory protections that guard against further 
invasion of privacy. . . .  [T]he Act requires that “[o]nly DNA 
records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall 
be collected and stored.”  No purpose other than identification is 
permissible . . . .  In light of the scientific and statutory 
safeguards, once [King’s] DNA was lawfully collected, the STR 
analysis of [King’s] DNA pursuant to CODIS procedures did not 
                                                          
 168.  See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 594, 42 A.3d 549, 575 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958 
(2013) (“As other courts have concluded, we look at any DNA collection effort as two discrete 
and separate searches.  The first search is the actual swab of the inside of [the arrestee’s] mouth 
and the second is the analysis of the DNA sample thus obtained, a step required to produce the 
DNA profile.”). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  See United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d, 652 F.3d 
387 (3d Cir. 2011) (agreeing that the physical intrusion of the body implicated by the buccal swab 
is not greatly intrusive, but it is the searching of the DNA that is cause for alarm). 
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amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the 
DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment.
172
 
While discussing these safeguards, the Court acknowledged the 
possibility for abuse,
173
 but skirted the privacy issue implicated by the 
second search.  Disregarding its emphasis on the scope of privacy rights in 
cases leading up to King,
174
 the Court ultimately undervalued Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights. 
Privacy is not just about personal privacy; it includes the right to 
informational privacy, personal autonomy, peace of mind, and feeling safe 
from government invasion.
175
  Indeed, Justice Sotomayor, concurring in 
United States v. Jones, advocated that the “unique attributes of GPS 
surveillance” be taken into account when considering reasonable societal 
                                                          
 172.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (citation omitted) (quoting Vernonia 
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995)). 
 173.  Id. at 1979 (“While science can always progress further, and those progressions may have 
Fourth Amendment consequences, alleles at the CODIS loci ‘are not at present revealing 
information beyond identification.’ . . .  The argument that the testing at issue in this case reveals 
any private medical information at all is open to dispute.” (citation omitted)).  The Court added, 
however, “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s 
predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case 
would present additional privacy concerns not present here.”  Id.  
 174.  For example, in Schmerber v. California, the Court held that the unconsented, 
warrantless blood test for assessment of alcohol concentration was constitutional because “[t]he 
officer . . . might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which 
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the ‘destruction of 
evidence.’”  384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (citation omitted).  Blood alcohol decreases with time, the 
Court explained, and because there was no time to seek a warrant, these “special facts” permitted 
bypass of the warrant requirement.  Id. at 770–71.  In concluding its opinion, the Schmerber Court 
left no ambiguity: 
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an 
emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are 
concerned. . . .  The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of 
the issue whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is 
indisputable and great. 
. . . . 
  We thus conclude that the present record shows no violation of petitioner’s right 
under the Fourth [Amendment] . . . .  [W]e reach this judgment only on the facts of the 
present record.  The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our 
society.  That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor 
intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way 
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other 
conditions. 
Id. at 770–72 (emphasis added). 
 175.  See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6 (2012) (“[T]he [Fourth] [A]mendment offers a 
guarantee not merely of secrecy but of personal autonomy.”). 
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expectations of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.176  Jones 
was ultimately decided on common law trespass theory
177
 and did not 
require the Court to answer the more complex issue of what would happen 
in a situation where the electronic monitoring did not require a physical 
trespass.
178
  The King Court, however, essentially provided the answer to 
this scenario in the context of DNA collection because the same problems 
that Justice Sotomayor recognized in Jones are manifest in King.  As Justice 
Sotomayor explained: 
 GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations. . . .  The Government can store such records and 
efficiently mine them for information years into the future.  And 
because GPS monitoring . . . by design, proceeds surreptitiously, 
it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: “limited police resources and community 
hostility.” 
 Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.  And the Government’s 
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of 
identity is susceptible to abuse.   
 The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at 
a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate 
information about any person whom the Government, in its 
unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.”179 
These problems highlighted in Jones parallel the problems associated 
with the collection of DNA from arrestees.  While the scope of DNA data is 
restricted because it is not collected from anyone other than arrestees or 
                                                          
 176.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  In Jones, the 
Court held that government attachment of a GPS tracking device to Jones’s vehicle, and 
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, was a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 948–49 (majority opinion). 
 177.  Id. at 949–52.  The Court explains why the government’s actions constituted a trespass: 
“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”  
Id. at 949 (emphasis added). 
 178.  Id. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an 
accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not 
require us to answer that question.”). 
 179.  Id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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others associated with the state (such as probationers and parolees),
180
 
DNA’s exceptional nature contains information on “physical characteristics 
and traits, genetic disorders, susceptibility to disease and ethnic origin.”181  
Although the Maryland DNA Collection Act includes limitations on the use 
of DNA to mitigate the impact on personal privacy,
182
 it still affects an 
individual’s right to retain control or have oversight of the data or material 
taken from his or her body.  This concept not only goes against the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of personal privacy, but also personal autonomy 
because it intrudes on an individual’s interest in security and freedom.183 
By authorizing the collection and processing of DNA upon arrest, the 
King decision effectively allows unreasonable governmental intrusions that 
“unjustifiably disturb our peace of mind and our capacity to thrive as 
independent citizens in a vibrant democratic society.”184  If the Court were 
to conduct a proper reasonableness balancing test, it should take into 
account these important interests. 
B.  Consequences and Loose Ends of King 
The Supreme Court’s decision in King has significant Fourth 
Amendment implications that extend beyond the case itself.  It leaves open 
unresolved questions and subjects certain classes of individuals to the risk 
of law enforcement abuse. 
1. Broad Implications for Broad Statutes 
In his dissent in King, Justice Scalia noted that the majority decision 
was very broad; he warned that because of “today’s decision, your DNA 
can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever 
arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”185  Compared to the 
Maryland DNA Collection Act, DNA collection laws in states like 
California are much broader and, therefore, raise more questions given the 
                                                          
 180.  Although, as discussed in more detail supra, the collection and entering of arrestee DNA 
into a database system may compromise the privacy of related biological family members.  See 
supra Part II.B.3. 
 181.  See Liz Campbell, A Rights-Based Analysis of DNA Retention: “Non-Conviction” 
Databases and the Liberal State, 12 CRIM. L. REV. 889, 891 (2010) (exploring the human rights 
implications of DNA retention). 
 182.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (“[T]he Act requires that ‘[o]nly 
DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.’” 
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1))). 
 183.  See supra text accompanying note 176. 
 184.  SCHULHOFER, supra note 175, at 6. 
 185.  King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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Court’s broad ruling in King.  For example, in Haskell v. Harris,186 the 
Ninth Circuit heard arguments challenging California’s DNA collection law 
but suspended consideration of the case when the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in King.
187
  The California statute, as discussed supra,
188
 is unlike 
the Maryland DNA Collection Act in that it does not provide for automatic, 
mandatory expungement of the DNA profile if the arrestee is acquitted or 
the charges are dismissed;
189
 nor does it limit DNA collection to individuals 
arrested for serious felonies.
190
  If the Ninth Circuit were to permit the 
collection of DNA from individuals arrested pursuant to the California 
DNA collection law, would it be a greater violation of Californians’ Fourth 
Amendment rights? 
While the King Court mentions Maryland’s automatic expungement 
provision, it does not stress this provision or include it in its balancing of 
privacy and government interests.
191
  Because federally assigned rights are 
the minimum that each state must follow,
192
 the Court’s decision in King 
may suggest that DNA collection laws in states such as California, which 
contain less restrictive provisions on government collection of DNA in their 
statutes, are unconstitutional.  Thus, while states need not change their 
statute to mirror the Maryland DNA Collection Act immediately, their 
statute may be challenged on the ground that the less restrictive process of 
collecting DNA, as opposed to Maryland’s process, affords less rights. 
2.  Aggravating the Pretext Problem 
The Court in King agreed on certain facts: (1) King’s DNA was 
obtained without a warrant pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act; 
(2) King was indicted for rape only after the DNA evidence was presented 
                                                          
 186.  669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 187.  Order for Publication at 1–2, Haskell v. Harris, No. 10-15152 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) 
(decision pending following en banc reargument on December 9, 2013). 
 188.  See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 189.  See supra note 86.  Provisions such as automatic expungement are especially important 
to Fourth Amendment rights because when a DNA profile is allowed to remain in a database 
system, it is subject to multiple searches in the future.  DNA, that remains in the database even 
after the arrestee is acquitted or the charges against him are dropped, leaves open the ability for 
law enforcement to investigate and resolve crimes that an individual in the database has yet to 
commit. 
 190.  See supra note 84. 
 191.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013).  
 192.  The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in 
relevant part: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.  No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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to a grand jury; and (3) no individualized suspicion existed that a search of 
King’s DNA would reveal evidence of the crime for which he was 
arrested.
193
  Indeed, the facts of King do not place it into one of the clear 
categories of cases where the Court has found warrantless searches 
constitutional: stop and frisk,
194
 automobile,
195
 consent of a third party,
196
 
exigent circumstances,
197
 and special needs.
198
  The Court, however, had 
one tool left: the reasonableness balancing test.  The Court seemed to have 
forgotten the reasoning behind the warrant requirement in the first place, 
which the Court clearly set out in McDonald v. United States
199
: 
 We are not dealing with formalities.  The presence of a search 
warrant serves a high function.  Absent some grave emergency, 
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 
citizen and the police.  This was done not to shield criminals . . . .  
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to 
invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.  The right of 
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of 
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals . . . .  We cannot be true to that constitutional 
requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a 
                                                          
 193.  King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965–66.  Law enforcement only obtained a search warrant 
subsequent to the first match, so that they might take a second sample of DNA from King.  Id. at 
1966. 
 194.  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding “that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a 
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of 
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.  Such a search is a 
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
 195.  See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991) (holding that even though 
law enforcement did not have probable cause to search the automobile as a whole, where they had 
probable cause to believe only that a container within the automobile had contraband or evidence, 
officers were permitted to search the container and did not need to hold the container pending 
issuance of a search warrant). 
 196.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179, 181, 183–84 (1990) (holding that a 
warrantless entry is permissible when based upon the consent of a third party whom law 
enforcement, at the time of entry, reasonably believes to possess common authority over the 
premises, but who in fact does not). 
 197.  See, e.g, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50–52 (1970) (discussing when the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is applicable). 
 198.  See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 664–65 (1995) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless, suspicionless random drug testing program 
required for students participating in high school or grade school interscholastic athletics). 
 199.  335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
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showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional 
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative.
200
 
By somehow linking the probable cause of one crime and making it 
justifiable to search for evidence for a separate, unrelated crime,
201
 the 
Court has aggravated the pretext problem—a problem that has concerned 
the Court throughout its history of deciding Fourth Amendment issues.
202
  
For example, the law on searches incident to arrest has long been criticized 
because of the possibility of officer abuse.
203
  It is easy for an officer to find 
a reason to stop someone in their vehicle for a traffic violation,
204
 and, after 
the Court’s decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,205 officers have 
discretion as to whether they will make an arrest, even for misdemeanor 
offenses.
206
 
DNA collection upon arrest is less justifiable than the typical search 
incident to arrest because the Court has only allowed the latter under the 
justification of officer safety and preservation of evidence.
207
  The Court in 
                                                          
 200.  Id. at 455–56.  
 201.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (“The arrestee is already in valid police 
custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.”).  The Court added that “[w]hen 
probable cause exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in 
legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those interests.”  Id. at 1971. 
 202.  See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“There is always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.”); see also Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (discussing how motivation and competition for “ferreting out 
crime” can pressure police to circumvent the law). 
 203.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (“[I]n most jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses the 
determination of whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest is discretionary with the officer.  
There is always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.”).  
 204.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 156 (5th ed. 2012) (“‘[V]ery few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance 
without violating some traffic regulation’ . . . .  It is apparent that virtually everyone who ventures 
out onto the public streets and highways may then, with little effort by the police, be placed in a 
position where he is subject to a full search. . . .  [I]t is clear that this subterfuge is employed as a 
means for searching for evidence on the persons of suspects who could not be lawfully arrested 
for the crimes of which they are suspected.” (quoting B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 65 (1969))). 
 205.  532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 206.  Id. at 323. 
 207.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is 
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons 
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.  Otherwise, the 
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is entirely 
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in 
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United States v. Robinson left the pretext issue “for another day,”208 and the 
King Court decided that day had not yet arrived.
209
 
3.  Familial Searches 
Familial searching, which remains an unresolved issue after King, 
opens the door to another form of law enforcement abuse.  A familial search 
is “an additional search of a law enforcement DNA database conducted 
after a routine search has been completed and no profile matches are 
identified during the process.”210  Occasionally, routine DNA searches 
produce partial match profiles.
211
  Familial searching, however, is when law 
enforcement “deliberate[ly] search[es] a DNA database [] for the intended 
purpose of potentially identifying close biological relatives to the unknown 
forensic profile obtained from crime scene evidence.”212  This type of 
searching “is based on the concept that first order relatives . . . will have 
more genetic data in common than unrelated individuals” and would only 
be used “if the comparison of the forensic DNA profile with the known 
offender/arrestee DNA profiles has not identified any matches to any of the 
offenders/arrestees.”213 
While the ability of DNA to allow for “familial searches” obviously 
makes DNA collection very different from fingerprinting,
214
 the Court in 
King alarmingly placed much weight on the similarities between DNA 
collection and fingerprinting to reach the conclusion that collection of 
arrestees’ DNA is constitutional.215  Because of the unique nature of DNA, 
however, free citizens may be implicated when an arrestee’s DNA 
information is entered into a DNA database system and compared using 
familial searches. 
                                                          
order to prevent its concealment or destruction . . . .  There is ample justification, therefore, for a 
search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control.’”). 
 208.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.1. 
 209.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).  
 210.  Familial Searching, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/familial-searching (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  See JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN 
U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 7 (2012) (“DNA presents privacy issues different 
from those involved in other biometrics collection. . . . [I]t can contain information about a 
person’s entire genetic make-up, including gender, familial relationships . . . .”). 
 215.   Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013) (“DNA identification of arrestees, of the 
type approved by the Maryland statute here at issue, is ‘no more than an extension of methods of 
identification long used in dealing with persons under arrest.’” (citation omitted)). 
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Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Maryland DNA Collection Act 
explicitly prohibits familial DNA searches.
216
  As of 2011, however, several 
states allow familial searching, including California, Colorado, Texas, and 
Virginia.
217
  California notoriously caught the “Grim Sleeper” serial killer 
after taking a DNA sample from his son.
218
  King seems to suggest that 
familial searches in this context would be unconstitutional; however, the 
King Court declined to further explore the familial search issue.
219
 
For people in states that do allow familial searches, any time an 
arrested family member’s cheek is swabbed and their DNA is archived, so 
too is information related to the family member.  It is essentially like 
creating a “gene for criminality.”  If your father is a criminal, his DNA 
profile will be in the national database; and because you share half of your 
DNA with your father,
220
 your DNA now can be more easily identified, 
increasing your chances of being accused, and possibly convicted, of a 
crime. 
Now that the Court has ruled on this issue, it is the responsibility of the 
states to protect citizens from potential abuse such as familial searching and 
arresting on pretext.
221
  That responsibility, however, is misplaced and 
should not be left to the discretion of individual states—protection from 
Fourth Amendment violations is within the purview of the federal 
government and should be a right equally protected for all. 
C.  DNA and Computers: How Far the Government Can Plausibly Go 
Without Violating the Fourth Amendment 
What, then, could have been a better solution to prevent the vast 
broadening of the Fourth Amendment the Court effectively accomplished 
with its ruling in King?  Given that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding searches of DNA is fairly undeveloped,
222
 a similar model to turn 
to is how courts have dealt with searches of seized computers.  A strong 
analogy might be drawn between computer data and DNA information: 
                                                          
 216.  Id. at 1967 (“Tests for familial matches are also prohibited.”). 
 217.  Familial Searching, supra note 210. 
 218.  Lauren Sher & Neal Karlinsky, New Technique of Using Family’s DNA Led Police to 
‘Grim Sleeper’ Suspect, ABCNEWS.COM (July 8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/familys-
dna-led-police-grim-sleeper-serial-killer/story?id=11116381. 
 219.  See supra note 216. 
 220.  See Campbell, supra note 181 (“An individual’s DNA . . . is inherited from both one’s 
parents.”). 
 221.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 222.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013) (“[T]he DNA swab procedure used here 
presents a question the Court has not yet addressed . . . .”). 
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DNA searches are conducted via government technology, and DNA 
samples contain vast amounts of personal information in a very small 
amount of space.
223
  Similar to what occurs when a computer is seized and 
then searched at a later time, relevant DNA information cannot be separated 
from irrelevant information at the site of the search, so the government has 
no choice but to take it all.
224
  Additionally, computer and DNA database 
searches threaten the same type of government abuse, such as exploratory 
searches into personal information that are detached from law 
enforcement’s original suspicions for arrest.225 
Rather than understand the process of collecting and entering an 
arrestee’s DNA into a database as two distinct searches—the physical swab 
and the analysis of the DNA sample—the DNA collection effort could be 
broken down into three steps that may or may not be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment: (1) the physical collection of the DNA sample; (2) the 
creation of the DNA profile from the DNA sample; and (3) the inclusion of 
the DNA profile within CODIS, or any other database, so that it can be 
searched for a possible “hit.” 
The second step of creating the DNA profile is arguably not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, the creation of a DNA profile 
may be constitutional.
226
  While step one does constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search, it does not address the more grave constitutional 
problem of unreasonableness as seen in step three; one can plausibly assert 
that taking a DNA buccal swab and creating a profile from the sample is 
constitutional,
227
 yet inclusion of the DNA profile within CODIS, and the 
unfettered ability to search for a “hit” within that database, cannot be said to 
be a reasonable search.
228
 
For these reasons, the King Court should have required the 
government to obtain a search warrant before entering an arrestee’s DNA 
sample into a DNA database to search for a “hit,” just as courts have 
                                                          
 223.  Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One 
Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2011). 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Catherine W. Kimel, DNA Profiles, Computer Searches, and the Fourth Amendment, 62 
DUKE L.J. 933, 968 (2013) (“CODIS searches are, in essence, general-warrant computer searches 
turned on their head: Instead of searching a single computer for evidence of any and every crime, 
DNA matching searches any and every CODIS subject for evidence of one particular crime (times 
one hundred thousand, every day).”). 
 226.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 227.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 228.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
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required a search warrant for post-seizure computer searches.
229
  As with 
warrants in other contexts, a DNA warrant could be issued upon a showing 
of probable cause to believe that the specific DNA profile the government 
wishes to compare its sample against will produce evidence of the crime 
under investigation. 
1.  Beginning With Step Two: The Creation of an Information-
Limited DNA Profile from the Information-Rich DNA Sample 
 As mentioned supra, the second “search” may not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, not because it is a reasonable search, but because it arguably is 
not a search at all.
230
  In his article Searches and Seizures in a Digital 
World, Professor Orin S. Kerr explored the ways in which the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the search and seizure of computer data and 
questioned when a search occurs during the retrieval of information from a 
computer hard drive.
231
  According to Professor Kerr, “a search occurs 
when information from or about the data is exposed to possible human 
observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than when it is 
copied by the hard drive or processed by the computer.”232  Professor Kerr 
found support in United States v. Karo,
233
 a Supreme Court case in which 
the defendant was being investigated as part of a narcotics conspiracy and 
received cans of ether, one of which contained a police-placed transmitter 
intended to help track the defendant’s movements.234  The Court determined 
that merely placing the transmitter in an ether can transferred to the 
defendant was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because the 
transmitter was not used to convey information to the police.
235
 
                                                          
 229.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 230.  See supra Part II.A.2.  I begin with the second search because it is well-established that 
the first search—the buccal swab technique—is a reasonable search that does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 231.  Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 532, 534–35 
(2005) (listing “four basic differences between the dynamics of traditional home searches and the 
new computer searches” and “how the Fourth Amendment applies to the data acquisition stage of 
computer searches”). 
 232.  Id. at 551.  Kerr provided three arguments to support his reasoning: “First, focusing on 
the exposure of data most accurately transfers our physical world notions of searches to the 
context of computers. . . .  Second, the exposure-based approach reinforces the traditional Fourth 
Amendment concern with limiting the scope of searches. . . .  Third, the exposure-based approach 
proves much easier to administer than the alternatives.”  Id. at 551–52. 
 233.  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 234.  Id. at 708–10; see Kerr, supra note 231, at 553–54 (discussing Karo). 
 235.  Karo, 468 U.S. at 712. 
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Professor Kerr found further support in Arizona v. Hicks.
236
  In Hicks, 
a law enforcement officer was searching an apartment and saw valuable 
stereo pieces.
237
  Suspicious that the stereo was stolen, he wrote down the 
serial numbers of some of the pieces.
238
  The Court held that merely 
copying these serial numbers did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
seizure.
239
 
Similar to copying serial numbers or computer data contained in a hard 
drive, DNA information is “copied” from a DNA sample, and a limited 
form of the sample creates the DNA profile.
240
  A DNA profile that is not 
entered into CODIS or a state DNA database is useless to law enforcement 
and provides them with no valuable information.
241
  Therefore, if Professor 
Kerr is correct that mere copying of information is not subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, this suggests that the action of creating a DNA profile 
by copying data from a DNA sample should also not be subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny. 
It follows then that law enforcement may create a legal DNA profile 
from the sample.  Furthermore, the DNA profile arguably represents only a 
limited copy of the original DNA sample, as the profile excludes a “genetic 
treasure map.”242  Similar to the mere copying information discussed by 
Professor Kerr, creating a limited DNA profile is helpful for law 
enforcement purposes and may have a plausible legal argument to support 
constitutionality. 
2.  Step Three: Inclusion of the DNA Profile in the CODIS 
Database 
While law enforcement may be permitted to legally collect an 
arrestee’s DNA sample and create a limited DNA profile out of that sample, 
law enforcement should not be able to immediately submit the DNA profile 
                                                          
 236.  480 U.S. 321 (1987); see Kerr, supra note 231, at 558 (discussing Hicks). 
 237.  Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. at 324. 
 240.  Caitlin Smith, et al., DNA Goes to Court 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1047, 1047–48 
(2012) (explaining that, out of the billions of base pairs in the human genome, the FBI chooses 
particular base pairs to include in a DNA profile). 
 241.  For example, in King v. State, law enforcement did not benefit from merely collecting 
King’s DNA but rather from entering the DNA sample in the database bank and getting a “hit.”  
425 Md. 550, 557, 42 A.3d 549, 553 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 242.  Id. at 549, 42 A.3d at 577 (“A DNA sample, obtained through a buccal swab, contains 
within it unarguably much more than a person’s identity.  Although the Maryland DNA Collection 
Act restricts the DNA profile to identifying information only, we can not turn a blind eye to the 
vast genetic treasure map that remains in the DNA sample retained by the State.”). 
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to CODIS, or any other DNA database system, to search for a “hit” because 
allowing this opens the door to unrestricted searches and the potential for 
constitutional violations.  According to Professor Kerr, “[j]ust as an 
individual generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home 
and his packages, so too should he have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of his personal hard drive.”243  Likewise, arrestees should 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained 
within their DNA. 
There is a significant distinction between the moment when the DNA 
sample is collected (and a limited DNA profile is created by the 
government), and the moment when the profile is entered into a DNA 
database, thereby initiating a search for a “hit.”  Once entered, the DNA 
profile is capable of producing incriminating information if a matching 
profile exists in the system.
244
  Thus, while law enforcement may be able to 
collect the DNA of arrestees and have the limited DNA profile in their 
possession, entering the limited DNA profile into the database should only 
be allowed in the presence of a search warrant.  This prohibition would 
properly address commentators’ legitimate concerns that law enforcement 
might abuse their authority if they are allowed to include arrestees’ samples 
in the database.
245
  To be sure, although entering an arrestee’s DNA profile 
into CODIS to search for a “hit” may help law enforcement, constitutional 
rights cannot be ignored.  Thus, to protect these rights, law enforcement 
should be required to obtain a search warrant before entering an arrestee’s 
DNA profile into CODIS. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
When compared to the amount of emphasis the King Court placed on 
governmental interests, the time the Court spent on the privacy interests 
side of the reasonableness balancing test is unfortunately diminutive.  The 
Court’s ultimate finding after application of the reasonableness balancing 
test lessened the scope of protection of privacy rights for us all and has left 
the door open for government abuse.
246
  Requiring law enforcement to wait 
to enter an arrestee’s DNA profile into a DNA database until they obtain a 
search warrant would allow the government to continue to make use of the 
                                                          
 243.  Kerr, supra note 231, at 549.  
 244.  See supra note 67. 
 245.  See, e.g., Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee 
DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 
1226 (2010) (discussing the possibility that police might conduct warrantless arrests with the 
purpose of collecting DNA to verify a “hunch”).  
 246.  See supra Part II.A–B. 
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extraordinary capability and utility of DNA technology, without violating 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.247  
Careful consideration of the extent to which DNA may be used is 
imperative not only for various privacy interests and rights afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment, but also because there is no other constitutional right 
that would protect our interest in our own genetic material.
248
  While DNA 
technology’s enhancement of investigative capabilities is extraordinary, as 
is its ability to help solve crimes in a quick, accurate way, the cost of police 
intrusion into personal liberty is too high to allow collection and processing 
of DNA upon arrest of those presumed to be innocent.
249
 
                                                          
 247.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
 248.  The Supreme Court has made clear numerous times that the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination does not extend to the collection of DNA, blood, or fingerprints in 
connection with a criminal case.  See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760–65 (1966) 
(rejecting Schmerber’s claim that withdrawal of his blood and admission into evidence of the 
analysis that indicated intoxication was not inadmissible on Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination grounds because the privilege only protects “testimony [and] evidence relating 
to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner”); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 
1975 (2013) (“And though the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination is not, as 
a general rule, governed by a reasonableness standard, the Court has held that ‘questions . . . 
reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns . . . fall outside the protections of 
Miranda and the answers thereto need not be suppressed.’” (citations omitted)). 
 249.  Justice Stevens might agree. As he eloquently, but succinctly, explained in Bell v. 
Wolfish, “the easiest course for [law enforcement] officials is not always one that our Constitution 
allows them to take.”  441 U.S. 520, 595 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
